This paper provides a micro-level evidence that …nancial development impacts growth by reducing …nancing constraints that would otherwise restrict e¢cient …rm investment. I estimate a structural model based on the Euler equation for investment using …rm-level data from 40 countries. I …nd a strong negative relationship between the extent of …nancial market development, and the sensitivity of investment to availability of internal funds (a proxy for …-nancing constraints). I also consider size e¤ect, business cycles and legal environment as plausible alternative explanations and …nd the results to be robust in all cases.
Introduction
The relationship between the …nancial and real sides of the economy has long been a topic of intense interest and debate. The potential importance of the …nancial sector in promoting economic growth was recognized as early as Schumpeter (1912) , though this perspective was disputed by numerous economists over the decades that followed (most notably by Lucas (1988) ). Proper empirical work in assessing the relationship between …nancial development and the real economy began only much later, with the work of King and Levine (1993a,b) who reported cross-country evidence which suggested that …nancial development a¤ects economic growth by fostering productivity improvements. Since then, there has developed a large and growing literature that examines the relationship between …nancial market development and various economic outcomes, primarily utilizing the cross-country data and methodology pioneered by LLSV 1 (1997, 1998, 2000) . LLSV argue that the development of …nancial markets depends on a country's legal origin, which is largely exogenous to the country's future economic growth. 2 However, this body of work is based almost entirely on cross-country analyses which always raises serious concerns about unobserved heterogeneity across data points. Furthermore, these country-level studies cannot properly examine the channels through which …nance a¤ects growth, as this requires the microlevel analysis of …rm behavior.
The micro-level examination of the link between real and …nancial decisions of …rms has seen considerable work since the pioneering contribution of Modigliani and Miller (1958) , who showed that in a world of perfect capital markets, …nance is irrelevant for real decisions. This view has been amended and disputed by richer theoretical models, and empirical studies that have found a strong relationship between …rms' …nancial health and investment (see Hubbard (1998) for a recent survey). These 1 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrey Shleifer, and Robert Vishny 2 See Levine and Zervos (1998) , Levine (1999) and Beck, Levine and Loyaza.(2000) for recent cross-country studies. Several recent studies use time-series analysis, for example, Neusser and Kugler (1998) and Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) address the causality issues, and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2000) look at the e¤ect of …nancial liberalization on growth.
…nancing constraints are generally attributed to capital market imperfections, stemming from such factors as asymmetric information and incentive problems, which result in di¤erences between the costs of internal and external …nancing.
The results contained in this paper lie at the intersection of these two broad literatures. Utilizing …rm-level data, while taking advantage of cross-country variation in …nancial market development, I show that …nancing constraints, measured by the sensitivity of investment to internal funds, decrease with …nancial development. These …ndings are robust to a wide variety of speci…cations, and to the consideration of a range of alternative explanations. I also report a number of ancillary results that provide further evidence on the importance of …nancial market development for …rm investment. In particular, I …nd that small …rms are disproportionately more disadvantaged in less …nancially developed countries than are large …rms, i.e. they have relatively larger sensitivity of investment to availability of internal funds. Together, these results provide a micro-level foundation for one of the commonly cited explanations for the observed cross-country relationship between …nancial development and economic growth. Namely, I provide evidence that an improvement in the functioning of …nancial markets will reduce …rms' …nancing constraints. This will allow for easier access to external funds for …rms with good investment opportunities and this improvement in capital allocation will in turn enhance growth.
The methodology used in this paper is based on the established literature on investment with …nancing constraints, which began with the work of Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) . The …rst papers in this …eld, based on the Q-theory of investment, were based upon models that contained a number of very strong assumptions, such as constant returns to scale, perfect competition, and perfect capital markets.
The assumption of perfect capital markets is particularly problematic for my paper, as I explicitly assume that capital markets of the countries in my sample are at different levels of development, and therefore cannot be considered "perfect." I adopt the Euler equation methodology, utilized by more recent contributions to the …nanc-ing constraints literature, which has less restrictive assumptions than the previous generation of models, including a relaxation of the perfect capital markets assumption. 3 The advantage of using the Euler equation methodology is that it explicitly controls for growth opportunities captured by the marginal product of capital. In this framework, the sensitivity of investment to the level of internal funds is interpreted as evidence of …nancing constraints. This sensitivity is allowed to vary with the country-speci…c level of …nancial development using the interaction of the …nan-cial development index and a …rm-level measure of internal funds. This interaction is shown to be signi…cantly negative, which implies that …nancial development reduces …nancing constraints.
This paper builds upon several recent studies that similarly address issues on the role of the …nancial system in stimulating economic growth using micro-data. The work that is closest in spirit and methodology to that of my paper is Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) , which is the only other …rm-level study that examines the link between …nancial development and growth. In their paper, the authors …rst calculate the proportion of …rms in a country that were growing faster than they could have using only internally generated funds. They …nd that this proportion is positively related to …nancial development and to legal system indicators. Although this …nding clearly suggests that more developed …nancial markets improve the availability of external …nance in the aggregate, it does not have any bearing on the issue of allocation of capital within a country, as this would require identifying …rms that "should" be growing, given their investment opportunities. I am able to address this issue by using a structural model which explicitly controls for growth opportunities at the …rm level. 3 Euler equations for Investment have been estimated by numerous authors, with most studies concentrating on US …rms. See Whited (1992) , Hubbard and Kashyap (1992) , Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995) , and Calomiris and Hubbard (1995) among others. The limited work utilizing international data includes Bond and Meghir (1994) for the UK; Jaramilo et al. (1996) for Ecuador; Harris, Schiantarelli, and Siregar (1994) for Indonesia; and Gelos and Werner (1999) for Mexico. The only paper that estimated the Euler equation for several countries is by Bond et al. (1996) , which includes observations from Belgium, France, Germany and the UK. A related paper by Kadapakkam et al. (1998) studied investment in six developed countries. They used a reduced form approach combining Q-theory and sales "accelerator" together with cash ‡ow and cash stock measures. Also, they did not compare …nancing constraints across countries. Rajan and Zingales (1998) use industry level data to show that industries that require more external …nance grow faster in more developed capital markets. Thus, they claim that …nancial development a¤ects growth by reducing the di¤erential cost of external …nance. While their work is very innovative and yields a number of interesting …ndings, it is based on several strong assumptions. One particularly strong assumption that is implicit in their analyses is that growth opportunities are the same for a given industry in all countries. That is, if an industry is not growing at the same rate as it is in other countries, it is a failure of the …nancial markets. In other words, the authors do not attempt to control for the growth opportunities available for each industry at every point of time in each country. Again, the structural approach adopted here allows me to address this issue and to explicitly control for such growth opportunities.
Finally, Wurgler (2000) …nds that …nancial development improves capital allocation by increasing the industry-level sensitivity of investment growth to value added growth. Wurgler points out two reasons why …rms in less developed …nancial markets might not undertake the most pro…table projects (and thus worsen capital allocation). First, insiders might not be able to distinguish good investment opportunities due to the lack of information. In support of this proposition, he …nds that more …rm-speci…c information in returns increases the sensitivity of investment to value added growth. Second, insiders might not have incentives to undertake the most pro…table investments if their pro…ts are expropriated; he provides evidence for this hypothesis by showing that state ownership is associated with lower sensitivity and minority rights with higher sensitivity.
Although my study is in a similar spirit to these previous papers, it improves upon them in a number of ways. As noted above, since I use structural model, in the form of investment Euler equations, I am able to control for future growth opportunities by explicitly including the marginal productivity of investment (a measure of growth opportunities). Also, the model identi…es the information set available at each decision-making point, which allows for the speci…cation of a valid instrument set 5 and the use of an appropriate estimation technique. In addition, the model allows for the interpretation of estimated coe¢cients as structural parameters, which provides an additional check on the plausibility of my results. Furthermore, by using …rm-level data, rather than industry-level aggregates, I exploit …rm heterogeneity in the productivity of capital. Since some …rms will be more productive than others within the same industry, allocating capital to the industry as a whole is not as e¢cient as allocating capital to the most productive …rms within each industry.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the structural investment model based on a dynamic optimization problem and discusses …nancing constraints.
Section 3 discusses the empirical model and estimation methodology, and Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 provides the main results including the analysis of structural parameters. Section 6 presents several tests of alternative explanations, including the size e¤ect, business cycles and legal system. Section 7 presents the auxiliary results using single-country regressions. Finally, Section 8 provides conclusions and directions for future research.
The Model of Investment

The Optimization Problem
The dynamic model of the …rm value optimization is reproduced in this section. This model is similar to models used in previous studies (listed in footnote 3), and follows closely the speci…cation in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) . The model is simpli…ed here because it ignores the possibility of debt …nancing. However, this simpli…cation does not a¤ect the resulting …rst order conditions for investment, which are the focus of this paper. 4 In this model shareholders (or managers) are maximizing the present value of the …rm, which is equal to the expected discounted value of dividends subject 4 Formally including debt into the problem results in a separate Euler equation for debt, see Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) for derivation. However, the investment Euler equation is not directly related to the debt Euler equation and is not a¤ected by adding debt into the model.
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to the capital accumulation and external …nancing constraints. The …rm value is given by:
subject to
Here D t is the dividend paid to shareholders and is given by the "sources equal uses" constraint (2);¯t +s¡1 ; is a discount factor from the period t + s to period t. In the capital accumulation constraint (3) K t is the beginning of the period capital stock, I t is the investment expenditure and ± is the depreciation rate. The restricted pro…t function (i.e. it is already maximized with respect to variable costs) is denoted by ¦(K t ; » t ), where » t is a productivity shock.
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The adjustment cost of investment is given by the function C(I t ; K t ), and is assumed to result in a loss of a portion of investment. The …nancial frictions are introduced via a non-negativity constraint on dividends (4), and the multiplier on this constraint is denoted¸t below. This multiplier equals to the shadow cost associated with raising new equity, which implies that external (equity) …nancing is costly and this extra cost is due to information or 5
The pro…t function depends on the beginning of the period capital, and hence the implicit assumption is that investment becomes productive only in the next period (i.e., a one period time to build lag). I ignore the price of invesment which is replaced by …xed and time e¤ects in the estimation. I also ignore tax considerations due to data constraints. 7 contracting costs. 6 This shadow cost is used in de…ning …nancing constraints, which are discussed below.
The Euler Equation
The Euler equation derived from the above maximization problem (derivations are available from the author) is given by:
Here,
@C @I
is the marginal adjustment cost of investment,
@¦ @K
is the marginal "pro…t" of capital, further referred as MPK, (the contribution of an extra unit of capital to the …rm's pro…ts), and
s the relative shadow cost of external …nance in periods t and t + 1: I refer to the factor £ t as "…nancing constraints" and discuss it in a separate section below. The intuition behind this Euler equation is that the marginal cost of investing today on the left hand side (given by the adjustment cost and the price of investment goods, normalized to one) is equal to the discounted marginal cost of postponing investment until tomorrow, on the right hand side. The latter is equal to the sum of the foregone marginal bene…t of an extra unit in capital,
given by MPK, plus the adjustment cost and price of investment tomorrow (again normalized to one).
To arrive at the empirical model, one must identify empirical measures for …nanc-ing constraints and MPK, specify a functional form for adjustment costs, linearize the Euler equation and eliminate the expectation operator. These issues are addressed in the subsections below.
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Several in ‡uential papers addressed the sources of information-or contracting-related frictions in detail. See, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Myers and Majluf (1984) , Hart (1995) and others. Here, these frictions are exogenous to the …rm and are represented by the shadow value of external …nance. Another possible way to introduce …nancial frictions is by exogenously limiting the amount of debt that the …rm can raise at any point in time. This will create a shadow value of debt, which has the same e¤ect in the Euler equation as the shadow value of equity. 8
Financing Constraints
At the heart of the …nancing constraints theory is the factor
which is the relative shadow cost of external …nance in periods t and t + 1. If the shadow cost of external funds is higher in period t than it is expected to be in period t + 1 (i.e.¸t >¸t +1 ), then £ t < 1 and it acts as an additional discount factor which makes current period funds more expensive to use than the next period funds and therefore induces the …rm to postpone or reduce its investment. In this case we say that the …rm is "…nancially constrained," and £ t is the (degree of) …nancing constraints.
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In perfect capital markets¸t =¸t +1 = 0 for all t and hence £ t = 1 and the …rm is never constrained. With capital-markets imperfections,¸t depends on a vector of state variables, including the productivity shock » t . Therefore,¸t is time-varying and could be identi…ed with some observable …rm characteristics.
In the previous work several observable characteristics of the …rm's …nancial health have been used as proxies for the …nancing constraints. The most commonly used variable was the cash ‡ow. The problem with cash ‡ow is that it is closely related to operating pro…ts and therefore also to MPK and will measure investment opportunities rather than, or in addition to, measuring the availability of internal funds (i.e. the net worth). Using the terminology in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) it could be argued that the change in cash ‡ow would simultaneously re ‡ect a change in "fundamentals" (increase in marginal productivity) and "…nancials" (increase in the net worth of the …rm, which will relax …nancing constraints).
As a measure of the internal funds, I use the stock of liquid assets, speci…cally stock of cash and marketable securities scaled by total assets (hereafter referred to as Cash Stock). The cash stock has an intuitive interpretation as "cash on hand" that 7
If, on the other side, £ t > 1, the …rm expects to be more constrained tomorrow (time t+1) than it is today and at time t its investment will be unconstrained. In this case the …rm is more likely to invest at time t, since the discount factor¯is increased by the amount £ t (i.e. the interest rate is lowered). Another possibility is that £ t = 1, because¸t =¸t +1 6 = 0: But this seems very unlikely in a stochastic model since¸t depends on a realization of the productivity shock. Even if it is possible for some …rms in some years to have £ t = 1, in estimating country-wide constraints such a situation is very unlikely. 9 …rms can use for investment if the opportunities arrive. One theoretical justi…cation for the cash stock measure appears in the Myers and Majluf (1984) model, where the amount of cash holdings, which the authors call "…nancial slack," has a direct e¤ect on investment in the presence of asymmetric information. This slack allows …rms to undertake positive NPV projects, which they would pass if they do not have any internal funds. This implies that if external …nancing is costly, there will be a positive relationship between investment and cash stock, this is the relationship explored in this paper.
Unlike the cash ‡ow measure, the cash stock would proxy for the future growth opportunities only in the presence of …nancing constraints. That is, …rms that expect high investment in the future, would accumulate cash stock to use up when the opportunities arrive. Since holding cash is costly to the …rms (because it diverts resources from the productive use and o¤ers zero return), the …rms will accumulate cash stock only if they expect to be …nancially constrained in the future. The evidence consistent with this hypothesis is presented in Opler et al. (1999) , among others. I assume that the …rm makes its decision for period t investment at the beginning of that year (or, equivalently, the end of previous year). Therefore the appropriate timing of the cash stock is t ¡ 1, because the investment decision depends on how much cash a …rm has before starting the investment. I parametrize the …nancing 8 Kim et al. (1998) , Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel (1995) and Calomiris and Himmelberg (1996) also …nd that …rms with lower costs of external …nance maintain lower levels of …nancial working capital. Despite the growing empirical evidence on the "precautionary savings" by …nancially constrained …rms, this hypothesis still remains controversial, see for example Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ; their view is disputed in Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000) .
constraints as a function of cash stock as
where a 0i is a …rm-speci…c level of …nancing constraints (which enters into the …xed e¤ects) and Cash it¡1 is the cash stock. The sensitivity of investment to …nancial health, measured by the parameter a; is the main focus of this paper. Recall from the discussion above that under perfect capital markets, £ it = 1, hence a = 0 (i.e. investment is not related to internal funds). The larger the capital market imperfections, the larger will be the sensitivity of investment to the amount of internal funds.
The main argument of this paper is that if …nancial development decreases capital market imperfections, it should also decrease the coe¢cient a: In other words, the coe¢cient a is allowed to depend on the country-level measure of …nancial development (hereafter FD), given by:
Thus, the focus is on the interaction of FD and Cash, i.e. coe¢cient a 2 , and it is expected to be negative, which will imply that …nancial development reduces the sensitivity of investment to internal funds (i.e. …nancing constraints). 
Measuring MPK
The measure of MPK, derived from the pro…t maximization problem (derivations are available from the author), is given by
where S K is a sales to capital ratio, µ = ® k ¹ ; ® k is the capital share in the production function and ¹ is a markup.
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This is a sales-based measure. An alternative measure, which has been used in previous work (also derived in Appendix 2) is an operating-pro…ts measure. Although both measures are based on strong assumptions, 11 the sales-based measure is less correlated with cash ‡ow than the operating pro…ts measure (which basically is equal to cash ‡ow). As discussed above, cash ‡ow would simultaneously proxy for change in "fundamentals" and "…nancials," therefore I prefer to use the sales-based measure. As discussed in the previous section, I assume that the …rm makes the period t investment decision at the end of the period t ¡ 1.
Therefore the appropriate timing for the sales to capital ratio is the end of period t:
Adjustment Costs
The adjustment cost function is given by C(
This adjustment cost function is slightly more general than the one used in the traditional models because it includes lagged investment to capital ratio with an additional parameter g. It is added to capture strong persistence in investment to capital ratios present in the data. This extended functional form allows for the more common form with g = 0, which could be tested empirically. The intuition for this added term is that it may be easier for the …rm to continue investment at some fraction g of the previous period ratio, since, for example, it has hired workers or made some other arrangements which would be costly to cancel. Parameter º i could be interpreted as some …rm-speci…c level of investment at which adjustment costs are minimized. The
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In the de…nition used here, the parameter ® k (the capital share) is likely to be industry-speci…c, and a markup (the measure of the market power) will be either industry or …rm-speci…c. However in the empirical work, the coe¢cient on sales to capital is assumed to be constant across all …rms. This will cause a measurement error, which is likely to bias the coe¢cient on the sales to capital toward zero. This problem is ameliorated with the …xed e¤ects, which capture the …rm-speci…c level of sales to capital.
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The operating-pro…ts measure assumes that there are no …xed costs (i.e., reported Cost of Goods Sold re ‡ects only variable costs) and no quasi-…xed factors of production (such as R&D capital or intangible assets). The sales-based measure assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function; while this is a questionable assumption, the sales-based measure allows for quasi-…xed factors of production and …xed costs. 12 marginal adjustment cost of investment is given by:
Linearization and Expectations
Although the stochastic discount factor introduced by …nancing constraints, £ t enters the Euler equation in a multiplicative form, in empirical work it is often easier to estimate and interpret …nancing constraints when they enter additively. Similarly, it is convenient to separate the discount factor¯t in a linear term to allow for countryand time-speci…c discount factors. Following Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) , I
linearize the product of¯t; £ t and the marginal bene…t of investment (expression in curly brackets in (5), here denoted as f:g t ) using a …rst-order Taylor approximation around the means. Since £ t could be above or below one, its mean should be a value around one. Denoting the unconditional mean of the expression in curly brackets as°; and the average discount factor as¯; the approximation is given by (ignoring constant terms):
Finally, I assume rational expectations, which allows me to replace expectations with realized values plus an expectation error e it : The error term is orthogonal to any information available at the time when the investment decision is made. I assume that the investment decision for year t is made at the beginning of that year (which is equivalent to end of year t ¡ 1). Therefore, the information available at the time of decision is dated t ¡ 1 since year t information does not arrive until the end of year t. Then, the orthogonality conditions for this model are given by E[e t jx t¡s ] = 0 for s > 1: This is equivalent to the assumption that the regressors are predetermined,
12
Note that I implicitly assume that the covariance between the …nancing constraints factor and the marginal bene…t of investment (the term in f:g) is constant (in the empirical model this covariance is captured by country-time dummies and …xed e¤ects).
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rather then strictly exogenous, and therefore require special estimation techniques discussed in section 3.1.
Empirical Model and Estimation
I obtain the empirical model by substituting (6), (7), (8), and (9) into (5), and replacing the expectation with the realization plus an error term. It is given by :
where the coe¢cients are related to the structural parameters as:
Here, f i denotes …xed e¤ects, 13 and d c;t denotes country-time dummies, that capture aggregate shocks, including productivity, prices, and other macro shocks that are allowed to be di¤erent for each country.
With respect to the coe¢cients in equation (10), the main hypothesis of this paper is formally stated as:
That is, …nancing constraints are nonzero (for at least some countries) and they decrease with …nancial development. (Note that¯4 and¯5 depend on previously 13 Fixed e¤ects arise in this structural model for several reasons. First, there are …rm-speci…c parameters for adjustment cost º i and for …nancing constraints a 0i . Second, the omitted terms that contain prices of investment goods and the conditional covariance of …nancing constraints and marginal bene…t of investment (discussed in 2.6) are replaced by the combination of time and …xed e¤ects. Third, the …xed e¤ects capture a sample selection bias if the …rms included in the sample have di¤erent investment policy than the rest. 14 de…ned structural parameters a 1 and a 2 :) The focus is on the interaction of Cash it (the …rm-level variable measure of internal funds) and FD c (the country-level index of …nancial development).
Hereafter, I refer to equation (10) as the "baseline model." I use the same framework to test whether other measures a¤ect …nancing constraints by replacing FD with the index of interest (for example legal system indicators). For robustness tests, I add additional interactions to the baseline model to see if the …nancial development e¤ect is still present when I control for other potential sources of …nancing constraints (such as …rm size or business cycles, described in section 6).
Estimation Methodology
The …rst issue in estimating this model concerns the presence of …xed e¤ects. There are several reasons for …xed e¤ects to arise in this model (see footnote 13). The …xed e¤ects are correlated with regressors because the model contains lags and leads of the dependent variable, therefore they need to be removed before the estimation. One common procedure for removing …xed e¤ects is mean-di¤erencing. However, since the regressors are not strictly exogenous (see discussion in section 2.6), mean-di¤erencing would create biased estimates. I use forward mean-di¤erencing, which removes only the forward mean, i.e. the mean of all the future observations available for each …rm-year. The forward mean-di¤erencing preserves orthogonality between transformed errors and untransformed original variables, which are used as instruments. Arellano and Bover (1995) show that when moments are formed by summing over …rms and periods, as opposed to treating each year as a unique set of moments, and when there is no serial correlation in the error term, the forward mean-di¤erencing is more e¢cient than the more commonly used …rst-di¤erencing. In addition, the …rst-di¤erencing induces serial correlation in the errors and requires appropriate error-correction, while the forward mean-di¤erencing preserves the error structure. The forward mean-di¤erencing, also referred to as the Helmert procedure, was used to estimate investment models by Bond and Meghir (1994) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) .
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The country-time dummies, d c;t ; are removed by country-time di¤erencing of all variables, i.e. regressors and instruments (the regressors are time-di¤erenced after the forward mean-di¤erencing, but the order of transformations is not important).
As discussed in section 2.6, the expectation error e it is orthogonal to the information available at the time when the investment decision is made, which I assume to be t ¡ 1. As noted above, after the forward mean-di¤erencing, the transformed errors are still orthogonal to the untransformed original variables dated t ¡ s, where s > 1.
Therefore, I use the GMM procedure, implemented as IV (instrumental variables), with t ¡ 1 and t ¡ 2 lags of instruments. The instruments are all the variables in the regression, plus cash ‡ow, cost of goods sold, industry dummies and the interactions of cash, sales and investment with FD (see Table 2 for variable de…nitions).
In all regressions I use heteroskedasticity robust estimates of the standard errors, which do not require an assumption of the independence of errors within the …rm (implemented with Stata's cluster option). To eliminate in ‡uential observations, I exclude 1% on each side of the distribution for each of the variables in the regression prior to transformations.
Data
All …rm level data come from the Worldscope database, which contains data on large publicly traded …rms in which there is an investor interest. Using only large publicly traded …rms allows one to compare "apples to apples" across countries and separate the e¤ects of di¤erent …nancial and legal environments, which is the center of attention here. An additional bene…t of using these data is the attempt by Worldscope to standardize accounting information to improve cross-country comparability.
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The drawback of the sample is that it does not have data on large non-public …rms. Even 15 For example, if one company reports sales with included excise tax and another company excludes it, Worldscope corrects this di¤erence and presents both with excluded tax. This is important for my study because I use sales as a measure of MPK and want to have as much cross-country comparability as possible. though I cannot extend the …ndings from the large public …rms to all …rms without the appropriate data, there is a lot to be learned on the cross country di¤erences in this sample.
The …rm data are available for 40 countries and cover over 7000 …rms for the years 1988-1998 (however the years before 1991 and the year 1998 have fewer observations).
Details on the sample selection are given in Appendix 1. The coverage within countries varies widely from as little as 1% of all listed domestic …rms included (for India) to as many as 82% (for Sweden), as calculated by LLSV (1997) who use the same sample. Table 1 gives the list of countries in the sample with the number of …rms and observations per country. The number of …rms in each country varies widely across the countries, and the less developed countries are underrepresented. This creates a problem with pooled cross-country estimation, though it is mitigated using the empirical techniques discussed in the next section. The main …rm-level variables are investment and sales, scaled by the beginning of the period capital, 16 and stock of liquid assets (cash stock). Other variables are de…ned in Table 2. The main country-level indicator is an index of …nancial development, FD. It is equal to the sum of the (standardized) indices of the stock market development, STKMKT, and …nancial intermediaries development, FININT, which come from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) (they refer to these indices as Index1 and Findex1 respectively). The STKMKT is the sum of three standardized measures: market capitalization over GDP (i.e. the size of the stock market), total value traded over GDP, and total value traded over market capitalization (two measures of liquidity of the market). The FININT is the sum of two standardized measures: the ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) to GDP (i.e. the overall size of the credit market) and the credit going 16 The model requires one to use the beginning of the period capital stock as a scaling factor for calculating adjustment costs and MPK. One alternative is to use lagged capital stock (i.e. period t-1 used as the beginning of the period t capital stock). However, this would not be appropriate if there are mergers, acquisitions, divestitures or other capital-changing events, which are hard to identify. I use the approximate value given by the ending period capital, minus investment and depreciation in that year, which is more robust to the capital-changing events, as discussed in Love (1999) . to the private sector over GDP (the amount of credit that is relevant to the …rm's …nancing).
Thus the FD index combines …ve important characteristics of …nancial markets into a standardized measure, similar to the ones used in other studies. For a robustness check, I also use the real growth of GDP (a country-year variable) as an indicator of the business cycle conditions in each country, which are also thought to a¤ect the …nancing constraints (discussed in section 6). Table 2 lists the rest of the country-level variables (and their sources), which are discussed in the relevant sections below. Table 3 reports means and medians of the key variables, by country. Table 4 reports cross-country correlations of the country averages for these variables. Several patterns stand out in these correlations. First, sales to capital, SK, is correlated with investment to capital, IK, which could imply that countries with higher productivity invest more (of course no claim is made about the causality of this relationship).
Second, FD appears to be positively correlated with the sales to capital ratio, SK.
This seemingly counter-intuitive result is likely due to di¤erences in industry and sample compositions across countries and should not be interpreted causally. Third, FD is positively correlated with IK, although this correlation is not signi…cant, so it is not clear if …nancial development increases investment on average. Finally, the cash stock is correlated with investment and sales. The interpretation of this relationship is done using the regression analysis below. Most of the country-level institutional characteristics are highly correlated with each other (Panel B, Table 4 ) and therefore should not be included in the regressions simultaneously.
Main Results
As is clear from Table 1 , the number of …rms included in the sample varies widely across the countries. The US and UK have more than 1000 …rms per country, while the rest of the countries have only 136 …rms on average (Japan is the third largest with over 600 …rms). Such a prevalence of US and UK companies will overweight these countries in the cross-country regressions and prevent smaller countries from in ‡uencing the coe¢cients, especially when the variable of interest is the interaction with the country-level …nancial development index. To correct for this I use two approaches: the …rst is the rank-based approach, and the second is the weighted regressions approach, discussed below.
The rank-based approach is based on the reasoning that to have a meaningful test for the …nancial development e¤ect on …nancing constraints, one needs to compare apples to apples, i.e., large …rms in one country to large …rms in another country. It is plausible to argue that some small companies in the US have less access to external …nance than the few largest companies in, for example, Malaysia or Thailand, which in the sample period enjoyed more attention from domestic and outside investors than many small US companies. the interaction is negative. This result is obtained in all the regressions in Table 5 .
This con…rms the main claim of this paper, that …nancial development decreases the sensitivity of investment to availability of internal funds, measured by the cash stock (this sensitivity is interpreted as a proxy for the …nancing constraints).
Structural Parameters
The interpretation of the coe¢cients magnitudes is best done in terms of the parameters of the underlying structural model, which are given by expressions in (11). To identify the structural parameters I use the minimum-distance estimator, described in Himmelberg (2000) (details on this estimator are available from the author). There are 5 equations and 8 parameters, therefore not all the parameters can be identi…ed. I choose to identify (¯; g; ®; a 1 ; a 2 ) and assume the values for the remaining parameters. I assume a depreciation rate ± = 0:12, which is the sample average of the depreciation expense to capital ratio. The coe¢cient µ, which translates sales to capital ratio into MPK in (7), is assumed to be equal to 0.23 (this corresponds to the values for the capital share ® k = 0:3 and markup ¹ =1.3
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). Finally, I assume the value for the linearization parameter°= 1:2, which is equal to the average marginal bene…t of investment, discussed in section 2.6.
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The resulting structural parameters are reported at the bottom of Table 5 . Although there is some variation among the estimated parameters, the average values seem plausible. The average discount rate¯is equal to 0.8 (and several models imply a discount rate of 0.9), which seems quite reasonable. Note that country and time speci…c discount rates are captured by the country-time dummies so the estimated¯represents an "average" discount rate, which is hard to identify in panel data.
The parameters of the adjustment cost function have average values ® =6.5 (this 18 The estimate of markup is taken from Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995) , and it corresponds to a demand elasticity of -4.
I assume that MPK is approximately equal to 0.2 (taken from Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) ) and the marginal adjustment cost term is 0.2. Since the value of°depends on the values of other parameters, I experimented with an iterative procedure when°was determined at every stage of minimization using the parameter values at that stage. This produced qualitatively similar results.
excludes insigni…cant value from model 1) and g=0.23. The parameter g is quite stable and always signi…cant (which con…rms the extended functional form for the adjustment costs), while ® varies quite a bit and is less signi…cant in general. The marginal adjustment costs function is then given by c = 6:5(
Since the average I K in the data is approximately 0.18, the di¤erence of the …rst two terms is equal to 0.14. The magnitude of the marginal adjustment cost depends on the parameter v i , which is not possible to estimate separately since it is included in the …xed e¤ects. For example, if v i is in the range 0-0.1, the marginal adjustment cost will be in the range 0.25-0.9, which is in line with previous evidence (for example, Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992) .
Next, I analyze the …nancing constraints factor, £; which is de…ned as a function of the structural parameters in (6). The sensitivity of £ to change in cash stock depends on the country's level of FD. Thus, a …rm in a country with high FD (i.e. one standard deviation above the mean of FD) has close to zero sensitivity of £ to the change in the cash stock.
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This implies that …rms in countries with high …nancial development, such as US, UK and Japan, are not …nancially constrained. This is not surprising given that the sample mainly consists of large publicly traded …rms. For a …rm in a country with an average FD, such as Spain, France and Israel, a one standard deviation change in cash stock results in 6.5% decrease in the …nancing constraints factor £; which could be translated as a change in cost of capital from 11% to 19%.
On the other side, for …rms in countries with low FD (i.e. one standard deviation below the mean), such as Mexico, Brazil, or Chile, a one standard deviation decrease in cash stock will decrease £ by 13%, which implies an increase in the cost of capital from 11% to 28%. Although these calculations are rough approximations, and appear a bit on the high side (i.e. imply quite large changes in cost of capital), they suggest that …nancial development has a very large and economically signi…cant e¤ect on the 20 For simplicity, in all the calculations I assume that the …nancial development index has a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The actual mean and standard deviation are -0.03, and 1.14 respectively. I also use values a 1 = 1 and a 2 = ¡1, while the average values from One potential problem with the main results (that …nancial development decreases …nancing constraints) is the omitted e¤ect of company's size on its …nancing constraints. Firm size has been commonly used to identify …rms that are more likely to be …nancially constrained (see Schiantarelli (1995) for a survey). The small …rms are more likely to su¤er from …nancing constraints (i.e. have larger coe¢cients on the …nancial variables) because information asymmetries are larger. If more …nan-cially developed countries have larger …rms, as argued by Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (1999) , then the estimated FD e¤ect could be attributed to the di¤erences in the …rm size rather than …nancial development. To test this, I add the interaction of size (measured by the log of total assets in US dollars) with cash stock to the baseline model:
The test now is that the main hypothesis (¯4 > 0 and¯5 < 0) still holds and alsō 6 < 0; i.e. …nancing constraints are smaller for larger …rms.
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The instruments now include size and interaction of size with investment, cash and sales.
The results with weighted regressions are presented in Table 9 . I …rst test whether size has any e¤ect when included by itself (i.e. in the model (13) only Cash i;t¡1 Size i;t¡1
Note that size enters Euler equation only as interaction with the cash stock (proxy for the …nancing constraints), and not in levels. If there is any level e¤ect, it is captured by the …xed e¤ects. One problem this size test is the nature of the sample, which mainly consists of the large …rms. Nevertheless, there is some variation in size among the …rms in most countries, which is exploited for this test. At worst, the sample selection creates bias against …nding any size e¤ect. interaction is included). Model 1 in Table 6 shows that there is a signi…cant size effect, that is larger …rms have smaller cash coe¢cients. For example, for the …rm with the mean size, the cash coe¢cient is equal to 0.12, and for the …rm with size equal to one standard deviation below the mean the cash coe¢cient equals 0.3, almost a triple increase in the investment sensitivity. Next, I include the interaction of cash with …nancial development in addition to the size interaction (model 2, Table 6 ) and …nd that both interactions are signi…cant at 1%. This con…rms that the …nancial development e¤ect is not caused by the di¤erences in the size of the …rms and that both size and …nancial development have an independent e¤ect on …nancing constraints. This methodology allows me to address another interesting empirical question: Is the size e¤ect equal in all countries, or is it related to …nancial development? The intuition is that the largest …rms in less …nancially developed countries could still enjoy an abundance of external …nance (obtained through access to external capital markets, or political connections), while smaller …rms will be comparatively more disadvantaged. I test this with an augmented model:
The test now is on the triple interaction coe¢cient, and I expect¯7 > 0; that is …nancial underdevelopment has more e¤ect on the small …rms (i.e. less negative e¤ect on the large …rms), and all previous hypothesis are expected to hold:¯4 > 0;
The results are reported in model 3, Table 6 . All 4 coe¢cients¯4 ¡¯7 (cash, cash interaction with FD, cash interaction with size, and triple interaction of cash, size and FD) have their predicted signs and are signi…cant at the 1% level. This suggests that …nancial development has a di¤erential e¤ect on …rms of di¤erent sizes. That is the small …rms are a¤ected signi…cantly more than the large …rms are.
For a robustness check of this result, I de…ne a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the size of the …rm (measured as the log of total assets) is smaller than the median size in its country (note that this de…nition reverses the signs on the size interactions). This de…nition is more robust to di¤erences in …rm size across countries, but is less robust to di¤erences in the sample size across countries (because for the countries with the small samples, some of the large …rms are classi…ed as small). The results, in model 4, although slightly weaker than in model 3, con…rm the above conclusion that small …rms are signi…cantly more a¤ected by FD.
To quantify the relative di¤erence in …nancing constraints of large and small …rms I use estimates from the model 3. Thus, in a country with the average FD, the average size …rm has cash coe¢cient of 0.15, while the small …rm (i.e. the size of one standard deviation below the average) has the coe¢cient of 0.38. However, in a country with low FD (i.e. one standard deviation below the average), the average size …rm has cash coe¢cient of 0.19, while the small …rm has the coe¢cient of 0.58. Thus the size e¤ect (the di¤erence in coe¢cients of …rms with di¤erent sizes) is about 35% larger for a country with low …nancial development, relative to a country with an average …nancial development.
Another way I address this question is by splitting the sample on high and low …nancial development subsamples (based on the median FD) and estimating cash and size coe¢cients (¯4 and¯6) from the model in (14) separately for each subsample.
These results are presented in Table 7 . For the high FD sample, neither cash nor cash interaction with size are signi…cant, while for the low FD sample both are large and very signi…cant. This shows that even in the sample of large publicly traded …rms, the …nancing constraints are a signi…cant issue for the countries with a low level of …nancial development, which not only have higher …nancing constraints on average, but have disproportionately larger constraints for the smaller …rms.
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Business Cycles
In this section I consider how the di¤erences in the countries business cycles could a¤ect my results on …nancing constraints. Recall from the discussion above that the main idea behind the …nancing constraints theory is that the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders creates the agency costs, which manifest themselves in the wedge between internal and external …nancing costs. These costs decrease with an increase in the borrower's net worth because, for example, an increase in the personal stake decreases the incentives to misallocate the funds. Since the net worth is likely to be procyclical, the agency costs will decline in booms and rise in recessions. In other words, external …nancing is easier to obtain during good times (when pro…ts are high and balance sheets are healthy).
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One potential concern with my result on the …nancial development e¤ect is that the sensitivity of investment to internal funds could re ‡ect di¤erent stages in the countries' business cycles, rather than the average level of …nancial development.
That is, over the short period covered by my sample, it could happen that countries with low level of …nancial development happen to be in recessions on average.
To test this possibility, I include the interaction of the real GDP growth rate, grGDP ct , a measure of the economic conditions in the country, with the …rm-level measure of the internal funds, the cash stock. Since the e¤ect of the economic growth is expected to manifest itself in the same time period as investment, i.e. growth at time t is expected to a¤ect investment at time t, the interaction timing is Cash it¡1 grGDP ct , where as before the cash stock represents available liquid assets at the beginning of the period t (i.e. end of period t ¡ 1). If the economic boom periods (i.e. periods with high GDP growth) are associated with the lower level of …nancing constraints, this interaction is expected to be negative.
The results are presented in Table 8 . The interaction of GDP growth with cash 22 This intuition has been formalized and tested on US data by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Gertler and Hubbard (1988) , Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) , among others. 25 stock is indeed negative and signi…cant at the 5% level in three out of 4 models (it is only marginally signi…cant, at 17%, in model 3). This implies that favorable economic conditions do improve …nancing constraints, in line with previous evidence on US data. The e¤ect of …nancial development on …nancing constraints is not signi…cantly a¤ected by the addition of the GDP growth interaction: the FD interaction remains signi…cant at 1% in model 2 and at 2% in model 4. This robustness check con…rms that the overall level of the country's …nancial development is a signi…cant predictor of the …rm's …nancing constraints, even after controlling for the business cycle e¤ects.
Legal System Indicators
The distinguishing feature of the modern corporation is the large set of laws that create the environment in which it operates (Zingales, 2000) . The …rm's …nancing activity is largely based on the …nancial contracts or securities and the de…ning feature of these securities are the rights that they bring to their owners (Hart, 1995) . The di¤erences in these rights and their enforcement across the countries have been a focus of recent developments in the literature, pioneered by LLSV (1997, 1998) . They argue that "the [legal] protection investors receive determines their readiness to …nance …rms," and show that the legal environment has large e¤ects on the size and breadth of capital markets across countries. LLSV also point out that the legal systems of most countries could be categorized into several broad legal families, which come from the English, French, German, and Scandinavian origin. The countries inherited these legal traditions from their colonizers, and the consequent development of the legal system largely depends on this "origin." The apparent exogeneity of this legal origin to subsequent economic development has been used to reinforce the arguments about the causality from the …nancial development to economic growth (see Levine, 1999 and Beck et al., 1999) .
It is easy to argue that better legal protection of investors should allow for more e¢cient contracts and their enforcement, which in turn should reduce the cost of external …nance. The goal here is to test whether the legal variables are associated 26 with decreasing sensitivity of investment to availability of internal funds. This will imply that better legal protection has the "real" consequences, i.e. allows for more e¢cient capital allocation by diminishing …nancing constraints. The previous research (LLSV and others) identi…ed several legal system indicators such as the e¢ciency of the legal system, the rule of law, the risk of expropriation, corruption, and legal origin dummies (see Table 2 As shown in the Table 9 , each indicator has a negative e¤ect on the cash coe¢cient when included by itself (all models with odd numbers). The results for legal origin are also consistent with the previous evidence: French origin increases …nancing constraints (model 11) and English origin decreases the constraints (model 13). However, when any of these indicators are included together with FD, they become insigni…cant, while FD continues to be highly signi…cant (all models with even numbers). Given these results, it appears that the index of …nancial development is a better summary measure of the di¤erences in the cost of external …nance than the individual legal indicators are. In other words, the legal system di¤erences are already re ‡ected in the level of …nancial development, and so the legal system a¤ects the capital allocation only indirectly, through better functioning capital markets.
Legal Origin as Instrument for Financial Development
The causality of the …nancial development and growth correlation has been debated since the …rst empirical study of this relationship by King and Levine (1993) . Sceptics of the …nance-growth link have pointed out that the …nancial systems simply responds to the demands of the growing economies and therefore is endogenous to growth (Lucas, 1988) . Others argued that the …nancial development could be a leading indicator of growth as …nancial markets anticipate the increased economic activity and develop in anticipation of this activity (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . The potential endogeneity of the …nancial development is a valid concern in the country-level or even in the industry-level study (as …nancial markets could respond to the anticipated growth of some individual industries). However, this endogeneity becomes less likely in the …rm-level study and …nancial development could safely be considered exogenous to the growth of any given …rm. Nevertheless, the test with legal origin as instrument for the …nancial development could provide a useful robustness check on the results and it is the goal in this section.
I use the baseline model (10) and include FD interaction with cash as a regressor.
However, now I do not include FD interactions in the instruments list and replace them with legal origin dummies and their interactions with the …rm level variables.
Thus, only the component of …nancial development that is explained by the legal origin is allowed to in ‡uence the investment sensitivity. The results presented in the Table 10 are remarkably similar to the main results in the Table 5 , with slight decrease in the signi…cance of the cash coe¢cients, but the FD interaction continues to be signi…cant at 1% level in all the regressions (except "rank 50," which was only signi…cant at 10% before and now is signi…cant at 5%).
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The conclusion of this section is that the main result is unchanged with the use of legal origin as instrument for the …nancial development.
Single Country Regressions
This section describes an alternative way to address the relationship between …nancial development and …nancing constraints. Recall that with the cross-country 23 It is also interesting to note that the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions is not rejected at 1% level in the models that use legal origin as instrument for FD.
regressions the …nancing constraints are parametrized as a linear function of the index of …nancial development, FD, given by equation (6). An alternative approach is to allow each country to have di¤erent levels of …nancing constraints (measured by the coe¢cient on cash stock), given by £ it = a 0i + a c Cash it¡1 : The country-speci…c cash coe¢cient, a c ; is obtained in the …rst stage regressions, where the Euler equation is estimated separately for each country using the model:
As before, f i denotes …xed e¤ects (see footnote 13), and d t denotes time dummies.
Then, I estimate the second-stage regression, in which the coe¢cients b a c are regressed on the country-level index of …nancial development (FD) using the model:
The main hypothesis now is that b 1 < 0; that is, the …rst stage estimates of the cash coe¢cients, b a c , are negatively related to the index of …nancial development, FD c . The second stage regression in (16) is estimated by OLS.
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The single-country regressions are not as e¢cient as cross-country regressions because they require estimating 200 coe¢cients (5 per country for 40 countries) rather than estimating only 6. However, this approach has a few advantages: …rst, it is completely unrestricted in a sense that all the coe¢cients are allowed to vary across countries. Second, it allows one to estimate the average level of …nancing constraints for each country, while the cross-country regressions leave a "black box" feeling because only the slope, b 1 ; is estimated. Since the dependent variable is estimated in stage 1, for proper inference the generated regressors adjustment is required. However, due to the nature of this methodology, such an adjustment proves to be quite complicated and it is ignored in this version of the paper. Therefore, the errors reported in stage 2 are not asymptotically correct and are used as an approximation. Table 5 ). However, most of the cash coe¢cients are not signi…cant at conventional levels, often due to the small sample size in the individual countries.
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Despite the problem with low e¢ciency, the coe¢cients are consistent and present interesting patterns, analyzed below.
Using the model in (16) There is one visible outlier on the plot, Korea (KR), and for a robustness check I ran the above regression without it, which results in a coe¢cient of -0.16, signi…cant at 1% (the standard error is 0.04 and R squared is 0.37). It is also interesting to note that the e¤ect of the …nancial development on the cash coe¢cient, given by the interaction term in cross-country regressions (which varied from 0.08 to 0.15, Table   5 ), is similar to the e¤ect found here in the single country regressions (the slope of 0.16-0.18 in the second stage). This make the single-country regressions a useful robustness test, despite the problem of low e¢ciency of individual coe¢cients.
Conclusions
This paper shows that …nancing constraints, measured by the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal funds, are signi…cantly negatively related to 25 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that less developed countries, that are expected to have larger coe¢cients, have a small number of observations, while more developed countries (which have more observations) are expected to have coe¢cients close to zero. 30 …nancial development. This negative e¤ect remains after controlling for …rm size and the country's business cycles, which also a¤ect …nancing constraints. I also …nd that small …rms are disproportionately more disadvantaged in less …nancially developed countries than are large …rms. I also …nd that legal system indicators (the e¢ciency of the legal system, the risk of expropriation, corruption, or legal origin) are negatively related to investment sensitivity (the measure of …nancing constraints). However, they lose signi…cance when …nancial development is added to the regressions. This implies that the legal system a¤ects …nancing constraints indirectly, through better developed …nancial markets. The impact of FD on …nancing constraints is unchanged when legal origin is used as an instrument for …nancial development.
The paper makes contributions to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the investment literature by estimating a structural investment model and con…rming the presence of …nancing constraints for a broad range of countries. This paper extends the only existing cross-country study, in Bond et al. (1997) , which studies investment in four developed countries. Second, and more important from a policy In addition I delete the following (see Table 2 -50% of all US …rms with at least 4 years of data available was selected by random sample.
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The resulting dataset has about 59,500 observations, the number of observations by country is given in Table 1 . 26 This rules excludes …rms for which capital is not a big factor in production. Half of these were in the US and UK; Japan, France and Denmark totaled 25%.
The original sample for the US had over 25,700 observations (…rm-years) while for all other countries at most there are 12,000 for the UK, 5,000 for Japan, less then 1,000 for most countreis (see Table 1 ). Even after the sampling, the US has the most data available. Ranking based on size of PPENT (first, ranked by year, then averaged over the years), largest firm in each country has rank equal to one (described in section 5.1).
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Weight Weight is a country-level variable equal to one over the number of valid observations per country (described in section 5.1).
Industry dummies
For manufacturing industries the dummies are on a two digit SIC level and for the rest of industries they are on a one digit level.
Country-Level variables
STKMKT Stock market development is Index1 from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) , equals to the sum of (standardized indices of) market capitalization to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and turnover (total value traded to market capitalization).
FININT Financial intermediary development is Findex1 from Demurguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) , equals to the sum of (standardized indices of) ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, and ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP.
Legal Origin Country's legal origin categorized into 4 groups: English, French, German or Scandinavian, from LLSV (1998).
Efficiency, Rule of Law
Efficiency of legal system and Rule of Law are two measure of the quality of law enforcement, from LLSV (1998).
Expropriation
Risk of expropriation is the risk of outright confiscation or forced confiscation by the government, from LLSV (1998).
Corruption
The measure of corruption, from LLSV (1998).
GNP PC Log of GNP per capita in US dollars in 1994, World Development Report 1996.
grGDP Annual real growth rate of GDP, IFS The dependent variable is IK t; the models are described in section 6.1. The Size is equal to the (log of) total assets in US dollars in models 1-3 and "Small" dummy in model 4 (dummy is equal to one if total assets are less than the country's own median level of total assets). The estimation is by GMM (IV), country-time and fixed effects are removed prior to estimation (see Section 3.1). Instruments are first and second lags of IK, SK, Cash, CF, COGS, size and size interactions with Cash, IK and SK, interactions of FD with IK, SK, Cash, and size, and industry dummies. All the regressions are weighted regressions, weights are equal to a value of one divided by the number of observations per country.
Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses; ***,**,* and a represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% respectively. Table 3 ). The estimation is by GMM (IV), country-time and fixed effects are removed prior to estimation (see Section 3.1). Instruments are first and second lags of IK, SK, Cash, CFK, COGS and industry dummies. All the regressions are weighted regressions, weights are equal to a value of one divided by the number of observations per country. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses; ***,**,and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
High FD Low FD The dependent variable is IK t , the model is given in (10) with added interaction of cash stock with country-year real GDP growth rate; variable definitions are in Table 2 . The estimation is by GMM (IV), country-time and fixed effects are removed prior to estimation (see Section 3.1). Instruments are first and second lags of IK, SK, Cash, CFK, COGS, interactions of FD and GDP growth with IK, SK and Cash, and industry dummies. The firms are ranked based on the size of PPENT (described in Section 5). In the weighted regression, weights are equal to a value of one divided by the number of observations per country. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses; ***,**,* and a represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% respectively. The dependent variable is IK t , the model is given in (10); variable definitions are in Table 2 . The estimation is by GMM (IV), country-time and fixed effects are removed prior to estimation (see Section 3.1). Instruments are first and second lags of IK, SK, Cash, CFK, COGS, interactions of Legal Origin dummies with IK, SK and Cash, (note that Legal Origin replaces FD in the intsrument set). The firms are ranked based on the size of PPENT (described in Section 5). In the weighted regression, weights are equal to a value of one divided by the number of observations per country. The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions, reported are p-values (this test is not available for weighted regressions).
Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses; ***,**,* and a represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% respectively. The dependent variable is IKt; the model is given in (15), Section 7.1; variable definitions are in Table 2 . The estimation is by GMM (IV), country-time and fixed effects are removed prior to estimation (see Section 3.1). Instruments are first and second lags of IK, SK, Cash, CFK, COGS, and industry dummies. Constants are included, but not reported since they are very close to zero and never significant. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * and a represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% respectively. -0.16, significant at 1% (the standard error is 0.04 and R squared is 0.37)
